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Application of Administrative Law with Regard to 
Privatization: The Hungarian Case  
 
 
Abstract. The essay analyses the process of privatization in the transitional period. In the 
early 1990’s, the privatization of the competitive sphere in Hungary meant the purchase of 
state-owned companies. Besides the legal background, the essay gives an overview on the 
political aspects of privatization. The next step was the privatization of public services in 
the middle of the 90’s. The privatization of the sector of public services is peculiar as 
privatised public services remain under governmental control even after their privatization: 
public administration is responsible for the continuity of the service, for its general 
accessibility and its quality. The essay deals with the issues of the application of law in this 
respect. The privatization of the welfare sphere was primarily characterised by the retreat of 
the state without applying alternative methods like initiating the participation of non-profit 
organizations. In the analyses of the privatization of the welfare sphere, the essay deals with 
the principles of privatization, as well as the constitutional problems involved and the 
conflicts of the central government and the self-governments.  
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1. Privatization of the Competition Sphere 
 
In developed Western countries privatization formed part of the neoliberal 
economic policy that occured from the 1980-s. This type of privatization 
focused on the decrease of the public sector’s scope, which meant the state’s 
withdrawal from the public services and at the same time the extension of 
market mechanisms in this field. Similarly to other Central and Eastern 
European countries, the first aim of Hungarian privatization was to trans-
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 So, the privatization of the countries in transition from communism 
has a different function and meaning at the beginning of the privatization 
processes. In Hungary the new economic administrative law concentrated 
on refining the administrative system from its old bureaucratic charac-
teristics and elaborating market institutions which had been in existence 
before the transition. The aim of this chapter is to analyse the new functions 
and activities of administrative law that have played a role in shaping 
privatization. 
 
l.l. Characteristics of the Bureaucratic Economic Administrative  
 System 
 
In Hungary the privatization process in the sphere of competition happened in 
a special way compared with other Central and Eastern European countries. 
The reason was the special features of Hungarian economic administration 
system which had the greatest effect on the methods of privatization. That 
is, from the 1960-s a special economic administration system had developed 
in Hungary as a result of economic reforms. The main characteristic of this so 
called “neither planned nor market economy” was that the legal regulations 
aimed to create market institutions, although in fact a high level of state 
intervention still existed. 
 In order to accelerate the disintegration of the traditional planned 
economy the most essential step was the division of executive and proprietary 
administrative power which was executed in 1984. It meant that most 
proprietary rights belonged to the administrative organs before being 
handed over to the state-owned enterprises, and came to be exercised by self 
governing bodies within the state owned enterprises. The administrative 
authority that had established the state owned enterprises supervised its 
operation from the point of view of legality, and could not intervene by 
economic decisions. 
 In 1968 another organization reform had already remodelled the central 
economic administration by eliminating the scope of the sectoral ministries in 
the execution of the central state plan. Instead, a special directional method—
that of the economic regulators—typified the connection between the 
ministries and the enterprises. Economic regulators were legal norms, but 
in fact represented economic means, such as financial, price, wages, and 
employment factors in the direction of state enterprises. 
 This indirect directional method represented a looser connection between 
the central public authorities and the state enterprises, than the directives 
aimed to execute the central economic plan. The so called “functional” 
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ministries
 and central administrative authorities were entitled to pass 
economic regulators and the sectoral ministries were responsible for a sector 
of the economy, such as industry, commerce, agriculture etc. 
 Nevertheless this new direction showed the limitation of the public ad-
ministration’s intervention, but at the same time was capable of maintaining 
the enterprises’ financial and political dependence in another form. Con-
sequently this looser economic-administrative intervention allowed market 
mechanisms and institutions
 to develop and most of them seemed as a 
basis for the new administrative system. 
 
1.2. Development of the Privatization Process 
 
If the privatization is implemented by the transformation of ownership, it 
has generally two forms: the securities of the company can be issued on 
the Stock Exchange, or the shares are sold by tenders. 
 The money and security market being less developed in Hungary, the 
only possible means of state enterprises’ privatization in the competition 
sphere was to invite tender for selling. Partly because of this fact, and 
partly for other reasons, selling by inviting tender remained the main form 
of privatization in the competition sphere. 
 The first form of privatization, the so called “spontaneous privatization” 
had already taken place during the rule of the last socialist government at 
the end of the 1980-s. By that time it was obvious, that although the self 
governing enterprises were more efficient and better organized than the 
previous organs of the planned economy, state ownership could not be 
reformed in this way. 
 Theoretical attempts to analyse this type of state ownership, could not 
answer the real nature of exercising property rights. The reason was that 
these enterprises did not operate in the form of commercial companies, 
but in public corporations. Secondly, in the lack of any real ownership the 
functions of the owner, the managers and representative organizations were 
interwoven and were exercised by the self governing body consisting of the 
employees. 
 Consequently, public corporations could not represent real business 
interests in any form. Legal regulations were passed in 1989, giving the 
enterprises an opportunity to become to commercial companies, in which 
the property rights were exercised by the former self governing bodies. In 
order to obtain capital investment and decrease the companies’ debts the 
self governing bodies sold some of its shares to foreign investors and 
banks. In most cases the managers themselves also bought shares. 
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 One of the advantages of this form of privatization is that being based 
on the company’s decision it could adapt fairly well, increase the capital, 
decrease the debts and income was generated for development. 
 The first democratic government stated that it had to defend state property 
from this “wild privatization”, and exherted strong administrative control 
on each step of the process of privatization. This defensive attitude displayed 
the characteristics of the old administrative culture which tried to streng-
then its power by widening its proprietary functions. 
 But this change was also related to other political interests too: the 
government needed the income generated by privatization in order to finance 
the budget deficit and pay off state debts. Besides, the government intended 
to appoint its own supporters to the most important economic positions, so 
the populist wing accused the former élite of trying to salvage its political 
power in the form of economic power. 
 By that time more interest groups, such as the employees, local govern-
ments, claimants of reprivatization, etc., also declared their claims to state 
property, but these interests were not successful. 
 As a result of this economic policy the total “renationalization” of the 
state owned enterprises
 took place. 
 The State Property Agency which had merely been an advisory body earlier, 
now became an administrative organ under the government’s direct control. 
The State Property Agency put the state enterprises under its administrative 
control and exercised property rights without censure and publicity. Actually, 
this organization was not based on its executive powers but on ownership. 
It meant that it was not possible to contest its decisions either by 
administrative or juridical means. 
 Furthermore, the State Property Agency, as an administrative organization 
was not capable of making business decisions properly and did not have enough 
professional administration to deal with the huge number of state enterprises. 
In fact this form of privatization was an unrestricted political privatization, which 
meant, that economic points of view were subordinated to political interests. 
 The process of privatization took place in two steps: the public corporations 
were obliged to become to limited companies, and the shares were sold 
without inviting tender. After some years it increasingly became obvious, that 
the process of privatization had slowed down, had become bureaucratic, a 
“hotbed” of corruption, although there were attempts initiated by the Govern-
ments to reform the privatization system. 
 So, besides selling, other legal forms of privatization, such as leasing 
contracts and utilising contracts were introduced. The reason was, that by 
that time, it was obvious, that privatization by selling contracts was not 
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realistic, because domestic capital investment was lacking. Besides, selling 
for foreign investors was not always acceptable because of the fear of the 
dominating influence of foreign capital. 
 The State Property Managing Share Company as a super holding company 
in state ownership was also established in order to run those bodies which 
were intended to remain in state ownership for a long time. 
 As a reaction to the inefficiency of the privatization process, public and 
political opinion increasingly stated the necessity of “the privatization of 
privatization”
 which meant the decentralization and democratization of 
privatization. In other words, the conditions must be based on legal regula-
tions, and other groups, such as the employees, claimants of reprivatization, 
public foundations, and public bodies must also have an opportunity to 
take part in privatization. 
 Sharing the income of privatization between the state budget and the 
privatized companies was also among the claims. 
 This new conception of privatization came into being only after the coming 
to power of the socialist-liberal government in 1994. The main aim of the 
reforms was to implement the privatization as soon as possible, because 
the companies under state ownership were making serious looses because 
of the way they were run by the State Property Agency. 
 Although the Act on Privatization of 1995 regulates the opportunity for 
other groups to share in’ the privatization, such as the claimants of repriva-
tization, the managers, the employees, domestic investors and social insurance 
companies, privilege is given to the foreign investors. The reason is, that only 
this group of buyers can pay in cash, which is needed to cover the state debts 
and to decrease the privatized companies’ capital for development. 
 The privatization process must always be published, which means, that 
openly published tenders
 must be invited and the points of view of the 
decision also must be written in a memorandum. The principles of privatization 
that must be followed during the decision making are also regulated in the 
Act on Privatization of 1995. 
 While in the former regulation several public authorities, such as the State 
Property Agency, the State Property Managing Company and Ministries took 
part in the privatization, the Act on Privatization of 1995 placed all the 
companies in state ownership under the State Privatization and Share 
Holding Company. 
 The main aim of the State Privatization and Share Holding Company is to 
sell these companies, not to run them. If the selling by invited tender was not 
successful, or the company is intended to be maintained under state owner-
ship, the State Privatization and Share Holding Company has to make utilising 
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contracts
 with private companies for the treatment. Those companies which are 
intended to remain as state property, such as central utilities, must be selected 
by the Parliament and enumerated in the Act on Privatization of 1995. 
 Considering the legal status of the State Privatization and Share Holding 
Company, special importance was given to the several kinds of control over 
it. The Parliament and the Audit Office have the right to supervise the 
activity of the State Privatization and Share Holding Company. Besides, the 
Parliament’s approval is needed for the Government’s most important privati-
zation decisions. The privatization minister appointed by the Government 
has the rights to exercise property rights. The members of the Board of 
Directors are appointed by the Government and they have legal responsibility 
for their decisions. The Directors of the Board of the Supervision are drawn 
from candidates of the six political parties represented in the Parliament. 
 
 
2.  Privatization in the Field of Public Utility Services 
 
2.1. Public Administration’s Supervision over Public Utility Services 
 
Before the 19th century the provision of public services by the state was 
rather unusual,
 and it was only after the industrial and demographic 
revolutions that it became more widespread. This period of time saw certain 
social changes notably an increasing urban population from which social 
problems, such as poverty, and poor public health arose. 
 From the 1980s in Western European countries and in the USA political, 
economic and social observers were generally sceptical about intervention 
by the state. These critics encouraged most governments to rethink their 
own economic policy. The previously positive attitude towards the state 
provision of public and welfare services came under increasing criticism. 
 Theories led to the conclusion that the role of the state in directing the 
economy must be queried. Neoliberal economic policy unequivocally held the 
increasing state intervention and the considerable state property responsible 
for inflation and the growing budget expenditure. Liberal economic thinking 
along these lines recommends an economic remedy for economic problems, 
promoting the extension of market mechanism, instead of etatism. 
 This was expressed in several economic policy programs, such as 
liberalism, deregulation, privatization, etc. Nevertheless privatization is 
perhaps the program which has had the greatest effect. 
 There are many ways to define and interpret privatization: in the most 
narrow sense privatization means the reduction of state property by selling 
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state owned enterprises. In a wider sense it is considered as a decrease in the 
scope of the public sector, the limitation of its function and generally the 
weakening of its influence, at the expense of an increase in private influence. 
 The new liberal economic policy presented a system of arguments on more 
levels for the approval of privatization: privatization was accepted favorably 
because it can give individual entrepreneurs the freedom to initiate under-
takings in those areas which had hitherto belonged to monopolies, and as a 
consequence the differentiation of public services widens the customer’s options. 
 The economic advantage of privatization is that it is capable of dissolving 
those monopolies which are not natural monopolies and which negate 
healthy market competition. Furthermore, the elimination of state property 
and the state’s bureaucratic and administrative direction of public enterprises 
would give way to private companies which are much more able to adapt 
to market conditions. 
 Privatization of public utility services has special features compared 
with the enterprises of the competition sphere. The main characteristic is, 
that public administration maintains its control over the privatized enterprises 
so that continuity, general availability and quality of the services should 
be guaranteed. The main forms of public administration’s control over the 
utility services are price regulation and the supervision of their operation. 
 The reason of maintaining of these types of administrative control is, that 
public utility services are monopolies in two senses: state monopolies and 
natural monopolies. Public utility services are often declared as state service 
monopolies,
 that public authorities have to provide. Natural monopoly is con-
sidered to provide the most effective service if only one farm is in the market. 
 
Special contracts
 are made in implementing privatization of public services, 
in which there is a special relationship between the public authority and the 
private farm. Contracts, such as franchise, concession and contracting out, 
are generally applied. 
 Public authorities often maintain their right of ownership in these 
contracts, and only the economic functions of the public service are assumed 
by the private firm.
 Public services are in the public interest, so public 
administration has to shoulder its responsibility, maintain its control, 
although these services are operated by private firms. The right of public 
authorities’ supervision can be stipulated in the contract or regulated by 
legal rules. Inviting tender for the operation of public services also serves 
public interest, because that private firm will get the right for the operation of 
the service, which has offered the lowest prices and the best quality. 
 If the public services are provided by state owned enterprises, utility services 
are in most cases connected with welfare, and profitability is of no significance. 
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In this case the state gives financial support to the enterprises if they are 
running of a loss. Secondly, although the utility services are maintained 
by public authorities they have an economic, not an executive character. 
 If the public utility services are privatized, the conflict of public and 
private interest emerges. If the utility is operated by the private firm, the 
public authority gives an exclusive right of the operation to the private firm, 
so that the profit should be guaranteed. Consequently, the public authority 
establishes and recognizes a private monopoly instead of state monopoly. 
Being in a monopoly position, the private firm operating the utility service 
can increase its prices, because it is not subject to competition. 
 On the other hand, the interest of the customers requires a lower price 
and better quality of the service, which should be guaranteed by the state. 
In this case the public interest of the state and the profit interests of the 
private firms are always contradictory. 
 For this reason, the most problematic point of these contracts is the 
way of determining the service’s price. In other words, these contracts are 
long term ones, and because of the changing economic circumstances, the 
prices can not be determined in a fixed way. Instead, the prices charged by 
privatized utility service enterprises are generally determined by means of 
price regulation. 
 It is generally accepted, that the role of price regulation must substitute 
for competition
 in those areas, where natural monopolies exist, and are 
operated by private firms. It means, that price regulation must perform the 
function of the income allocation of the competition: the service’s best 
duality for the lowest price, and the guarantee of the private firm’s profit. 
 The greatest problem of price regulation is that while the competition has 
perfect regulatory effects, price regulation is a legal method, which can 
not substitute competition in the same way. For example, application of 
price regulation is always based on the legislators’ decision, and there has 
not been uniform agreement on prices. 
 Secondly, the process of price regulation is generally long and compli-
cated, compared to the automatic effects of competition. Furthermore, the 
principles of the prices
 have not been elaborated in a sufficient way, 
although differentiated methods of price regulation have developed. 
 The institutions of price regulation—the regulatory bodies—are always 
independent from the governmental and political organizations, which is 
guaranteed by legal rules. It means, that only the Parliament has the right 
to regulate the framework of the prices, appoint the heads of the regulatory 
bodies, and supervise their activities. The decisions of the regulatory bodies 
can be contested in the courts. The regulatory bodies are public authorities 
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with professional staff. Their main tasks are to pass decrees regulating prices, 
decide in legal discussions between the customers and the private firms, 
supervise the budget of the firms, etc. 
 Former opinions emphasized, that price regulation is inevitable, because it 
must substitute competition. But regarding the inefficiency of the price 
regulations, more standpoints admit, that price regulation is less effective, 
than competition supervision. That is, one of the functions of competition 
supervision is to limit the abuses deriving from the monopoly. For this 
reason, the basic dilemma of the public service sector is whether the price 
regulation or the conditions of competition supervision must be applied. 
 Recently, developing technical requirements allowed market competition 
to be created in those areas, which had previously been natural monopolies. 
As a result, there is a tendency towards putting public utility enterprises 
under competition supervision instead of price regulation. These deregu-
lation programmes
 intended, that the prices of the deregulated sectors must 
be determined by competition. But deregulation can not be implemented 
for every utilities, or in all the activities of the deregulated utilities. 
Consequently, the elements of competition law and the price regulation 
are interwoven, and it is not easy to decide in concrete cases, which one 
must be applied. 
 
2.2. Price Regulation and Competition Supervision over Public Utility 
Services in Hungary 
 
Privatization of public utility services was implemented in 1996 in Hungary. 
Earlier, public service enterprises were placed under direct administrative 
control,
 even after the economic administrative reforms of the 1960-s. At 
the beginning of the transition most of them were transformed to commercial 
companies and the property rights were exercised by the State Property 
Agency or the local self governments. 
 The 1990 Act on Price Regulation declared, that in the new economic 
system prices are to be determined by market competition and the 
intervention of the government in this field can happen only in exceptional 
cases. These exceptional fields are enumerated by the Act, when the means 
of the competition supervision are insufficient to prevent abuses deriving 
from the position of monopoly. 
 Almost all public utility services are included among these activities, 
and put under price regulation. Price regulation means, that the sectoral 
minister or the local governments are obliged to pass a decree or by-law 
to determine the maximum level of the utilities’ prices
 to be applied. 
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 Obviously, the reason for placing these utility services under price 
regulation is, that they are natural monopolies and are not subject to the 
effects of competition. In this case the legal rule determines the prices directly, 
and the provisions of competition law are not applied. The reason is, that 
price regulation instead of competition is responsible for determining the 
“right” price. Secondly, the price is regulated in legal rules which can not 
be revised either by the civil court or the Office of Competition. Certainly, if 
the utility services are not under price regulation, the price is stipulated by 
the parties of the concession contract, and the competition law can be 
applied, if the utility charges a monopoly price. 
 Although the traditional means of price regulation was adjusted to the 
requirements of the market mechanisms, it was modelled to the state 
owned utility enterprises. In another words, this system of price regulation 
does not meet the profit interest of the private firms and the customers’ 
interest. The reason is, that although the Act declares that the profit must 
be guaranteed, does not regulate the methods and principles of the regulated 
price. It means, that the public authority is entitled to regulate prices and 
may exercise discretion in choosing the method. 
 The private company operating the utility only has the right to make 
proposals, which are not obligatory for the public authority. Being a legal rule, 
the regulated price could theoretically be contested only in the Constitutional 
Court, if it does not cover the profit for the private company. But in fact it is 
obviously not the task of the Constitutional Court. Furthermore, the sectoral 
ministers are dependent from the government, and represent its interests in 
determining prices. Besides, the local governments’ staff do not have the 
necessary professional skills to regulate the prices. 
 Suffice to say, this bureaucratic regulatory system does not meet the 
requirements for the regulatory bodies’ independence, the procedural guaran-
tees and differentiated regulatory methods. Naturally, the privatization of 
public utility services could not have been implemented on the basis of this 
regulatory system. For this reason, other solutions were sought to ensure 
the profit interest
 of the private companies participating in the privatization. 
 Firstly, regulatory bodies were established by the legislation in those 
areas, where privatization had been performed. These bodies represent more 
modern principles of price regulation, such as professionalism, independence, 
participation of the companies in applying prices, the representation of the 
customers, the function of balancing several interests, etc. 
 Secondly, the methods of price regulation are regulated in Government 
resolutions,
 which mean, that if the decree or the by-law contradict the 
resolution, they can be challenged in the Constitutional Court. That is, in 
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this case the decree or the by-law violates the principle of the hierarchy of 
legal rules. 
 In other cases the contracting parties stipulated the methods of the prices 
to be applied in the concession contract. The minister or the local govern-
ment obliged themselves, not to pass a decree or by-law regulating the 
utility’s prices which contradicts the agreement of the contract. The problem 
is, that when the minister or the local government make the concession 
contract, they represent proprietary function, and can not oblige themselves as 
the executive powers. 
 On the basis of these analyses it can be proved, that the system of price 
regulation is fairly contradictory and confused. There could be two possible 
solutions. One of them is the creation of the regulatory bodies and procedures 
that represent modern principles. But many experts are unsure, whether it 
is possible without traditions and whether its costs could be financed. 
 The other possibility is the extension of competition supervision. In this case 
the Office of Competition would become a “quasi” regulatory body, which 
means that public authorities would determine only the methods of prices 
and the Office would have the scope to decide in the case of abuse of prices. 
But the Office of Competition declared in its decisions many times, that it is 
not the task of the Office to determine the “right” price of the utilities. That is, 
not all utilities are under price regulation, and in these cases the Office has 
the right to decide if the abuse of prices has occured. But the practice of 
the Office shows that it tried to avoid investigating prices, and so the 
costs of the companies operating the utilities. 
 
2.3. Privatizing Public Utility Services in Hungary 
 
In Hungary before 1990 almost all the public services were state mono-
polies with a few exceptions, which were allowed to operate privately as 
individuals or companies. After 1990 the liberalization of state monopolies 
was completed. 
 The Constitution makes it obligatory for monopolies to be regulated by 
acts of Parliament. Besides the Concession Act several acts contain the 
regulation of state monopolies, e.g. the Civil Code, the Post Act, the Bank 
Act. Some of these may not be operated by private persons, but are the 
exclusive monopoly and property of the state. 
 The listed state monopolies in the Concession Act are transferable to 
the private sphere only by concession. The Concession Act was created as 
a framework act containing the general rules of concession, and the detailed 
conditions are regulated in clauses. 
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 Among the detailed activities listed in the Concession Act only a few belong 
to the field of public services, (the maintenance of public roads, railways, 
rivers, ports, airports, and public utilities, public transport, telecommuni-
cations, postal services) others are regarded as policy monopolies (the 
production of nuclear energy, and the production of drugs), and a third group 
of monopolies are regarded as financial monopolies (mining, state lottery). 
 
Concession
 means those privileges, licenses, or advantages which were 
given by the state to persons or organizations for those activities which the state 
is obliged to perform. According to this interpretation concession is a license 
given by the state for executing public tasks by private persons. Concession is 
therefore often considered to be a form of privatization of public duties. 
 Licensing, the practice of a state monopoly for a private party is often 
identified as concession. The main difference between concession and licence 
is derived from the two divergent positions of the administrative organ: when 
granting a licence the administrative organ acts as an administrative authority, 
but when awarding a concession it decides to enter into a contract, as an owner. 
 Another difference between them is that the conditions of the license 
are determined onesidedly by the state. If the applicant suits all the legal 
requirements he or she will have the right to obtain the license. However, 
the awarding of concession is always the decision of the administrative 
organ, as well the selection of the person entitled to the concession also 
depends on it. Conditions of practice of concession are determined by the 
mutual agreement of the parties. 
 The subject of concession may be the granting of a monopoly by the state, 
or the permission to utilize state owned property. By granting concession 
on state owned property the state intends to keep its right of control by 
maintaining the right of the ownership of its own property. 
 The concession contract is faced with the contradictory elements of 
private and public law. This conflict is caused by the existence of a civil 
law contract representing entrepreneurial activity and of administrative 
control enforcing the public interest. 
 This dilemma is revealed in the question, as to whether the concession 
contract can be classified as a civil law contract, or as a separate category. 
However, no explanation has been given as to whether the state can 
legitimately be regarded as an equal party in the contract, despite the state 
maintaining rights as the bearer of executive power. 
 Concession contract consists of the preclusion of competition and assurance 
of monopoly for the party entitled to the concession. Obviously there are 
cases when the competition would anyway be excluded because of the 
character of the activity: e.g. the building of roads and motorways. But 
 APPLICATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW WITH REGARD TO PRIVATIZATION… 349 
  
generally the award of a monopoly is itself diametrically opposed to the 
principles of competition. The question is, what kind of solutions may be 
offered to eliminate this situation? 
 The Treaty of Rome tried to outline an alternative: EEC countries have to 
ensure that enterprises should not be awarded exclusive rights which 
would contradict the law of competition as laid down by the Treaty of Rome. 
At the same time the Treaty allows for exceptions: those enterprises 
providing public service are allowed to depart from these rules if they are 
limited in performing their tasks. But any departure should not be in conflict 
with the public interest. 
 Another specific feature of the concession agreement is that in most cases 
concession occurs in areas typified by high capital intensity and low 
rentability. The public administration has to guarantee benefits for the 
contracting party to attract private capital. The measure of the benefits of 
concession activity depends on the concession fee and the price of the service. 
As the concession contract is a long term one, the contract may only be 
modified by mutual agreement. In the event of poor calculations or inflation 
the enterprise may make losses, and it would result in the bankruptcy of 
the enterprise and at the same time the public would lose its services. 
 More variations are applied in determining the price of the public services. 
On one hand the enterprise should be entitled to raise its prices in the event of 
inflation, on the other hand the right to do so may justifiably be limited 
because the activities of such enterprises are not conducted under market 
conditions which would force them to reduce the prices. In most cases the 
price of the services are determined in legal rules by the authorities. 
 The most specific character of the concession contract is the public element. 
The object of the concession is always connected with public property or 
public money. For this reason it has become necessary to oversee the making 
of these contracts to safeguard against corruption, and ensure equal 
opportunities. This rule makes it binding for the administrative organ to 
announce its offer of contract and to judge it by way of public tender. 
 The first step towards concession is to invite public tender which is an 
obligatory condition of concession. Public tender may be initiated by the 
state, a ministry department, or the local government. The right to invite 
public tender is always determined by the bearer of property, or governed 
by the clauses within the Act. The right to select the candidate for the 
concession follows from the right to invite the tender. 
 Concession contracts will be made with whoever submits the most favor-
able offer for the concession. According to the interpretation of this provision 
it is not obligatory for the state to enter into a concession contract if the 
350 MÁRIA BORDÁS  
administrative organ has declared the public tender invalid. If the public 
tender is declared valid the concession contract may only be made with 
the winning candidate. 
 The other reason why the administrative elements exist in concession 
contracts is the responsibility of public administration for the continuity and 
quality of public service.
 After the transfer of public services the public 
administration may not refuse responsibility. That is why public organs have 
the right to modify some provisions of the concession contract one sidedly. 
 Another departure compared to the civil law contract is the right of the 
administrative organ to nationalize the enterprise in the event of breach of 
contract. Immediate termination of a contract as a sanction of civil law would 
not suit the demand for continuity. As a consequence of being responsible 
for the continuity of services, the public administration has wide rights in 
supervising
 the enterprise, which may occur in three forms: the state may 
keep the majority of shares in the enterprise, thereby maintaining the right 
of control as the owner. 
 The state can also create opportunities for controlling the enterprise by 
legal rules
 or may entitle the ministry or government department to supervise 
it. Finally, the contracting parties may stipulate the right to control the 
enterprise by the state. 
 Concession contacts are made for a definite time to avoid the indefinite 
transfer of state monopolies. The maximum period of the contract is 35 years 
although there was an exceptional contract made for 47 years. 
 In the concession contract on one hand the state’s obligation is the 
transfer of the right of the operation of the public service, on the other hand 
the contracting party’s obligation is to pay the concession fee. During the 
existence of the contract the state is not allowed to change monopoly 
position disadvantageously for the party entitled to the concession, i.e. the 
administrative organ is not permitted to invite another tender, or to establish 
any new state owned enterprise in that field of public service. This regulation 
is necessary to guarantee benefit to the company. 
 After making the concession contract it is obligatory to establish a 
business association, and to obtain the licenses which are necessary for 
the practice of the public service activity. 
 
 
3. Privatization in the Banking System 
 
After the aforementioned process of economic liberalization had taken 
place in the 1960s the banking system had to be adjusted to the changed 
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circumstances. Previously, all the banks performed the same functions and 
came under the state budget control. The lack of scope meant that the banks’ 
functions were limited to the execution of the central state plan and the 
financing of state investments.
 
 The indirect economic administrative system needed a banking system 
which could promote the development of a capital based market. In this 
case the role of the banking system would have been to influence the 
market processes by economic regulators on the basis of the central 
economic policy. 
 For this reason the division of the functions of the central and credit 
banks
 occurred by the end of the 1980-s. The central bank (National Bank 
of Hungary) as the part of the administrative organization system performed 
only the monetary regulatory functions, but 5 state owned commercial banks 
were separated from the central bank. Although the central bank was 
empowered with monetary regulatory rights, its close dependence on the 
government
 was maintained. 
 The government appointed the president of the central bank and it was 
empowered to set credit and monetary policy. Furthermore, legal rules set 
by the government and the finance ministry were obligatory for the activities 
of the central bank. But the budget policy had the greatest influence on the 
central bank’s operations: the deficit of the budget was financed by the 
central bank’s credits, and the amount was not limited by any legal rule. 
 The legal regulations of the transition stated the independence of the 
central bank
 from the Government in 1991. That is, the Act on the National 
Bank declares, that the Government can not control the activities of the 
National Bank. The role of the Government relating to monetary policy was 
narrowed down to an advising capacity and representation by a minister 
in the Bank’s meetings. The Minister of Finance only has the right to 
reconcile the monetary policy and the finance of the budget deficit with 
the National Bank. Besides, the president and vice president of the National 
Bank are appointed by the president of the Hungarian Republic. The 
directors of the Board of Supervision are appointed by Parliament. 
 The National Bank is a share holding company under state ownership, 
but it is also “quasi” public authority entitled with executive power. That is, 
the National Bank has the rights to pass decrees which are obligatory for 
the commercial banks and which provide monetary regulations. The other 
executive task of the National Bank is the supervision of the commercial 
banks
 as to whether they operate according to the provisions of its decrees. 
 However the intervention of public administration began to prevail 
once more which adversely affected the operation of the capital market. 
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Although the Act limited the amount of credit to be given to the budget by 
the central bank, the budget can pressurize the central bank to issue 
government securities. So the budget’s financial demands still affect the 
capital market
 and squeeze credit out of the commercial banks and increase 
inflation in the economy. 
 The state monopoly of banking activity was dissolved, and as a reaction, 
new banks were established, primarily by foreign investors. 
 The Office of Banking Supervision was established in 1991 under the 
Government’s direction. The main function of the banking supervision is 
to guarantee the interests of the investors. The Office gives the licences 
needed for their establishment. Besides the technical, financial and personnel 
requirements, the Office has to investigate, whether the bank’s business 
plan serves the interests of the investors. 
 The supervision of the Office is extended to the commercial bank’s 
activity from the aspects of legality and safety of investment. The Office 
has the right to apply several sanctions in cases of abuse, such as to 
oblige the bank to take the necessary measures, impose fines, withdraw 
licences and relieve managers from their office. 
 
Obligatory privatization
 was also legislated in order to decrease the 
scope of public administration in this sphere. But in reality an opposite 
tendency appears. The state owned credit banks made heavy losses partly 
because they had many unpayable claims in the state owned enterprises, 
and partly because of the old management. Therefore the state saved them 
from bankruptcy with an increase of capital subsidy and consolidation of 
credit. As a consequence, the proportion of state ownership has increased 
by 70% in the banking sphere. 
 The property rights were exercised by the State property Agency, and later 
by the Ministry of Finance. Obviously, these administrative organizations 
can not have business interests in the banks’ activities which fed—among 
others—to banking scandals in many cases. 
 The conclusion can be made that public administration can not assume 
many different divergent functions (supervisory, monetary and proprietary) 
at the same time. The National Bank saves the state owned credit banks from 
bankruptcy with refinancing credits, and the Office of Banking Supervision 
performs a lenient supervisory activity over them. Furthermore, the National 
Bank determines high reserve rates for the credit bank’s in order to balance 
the budget. Consequently, the saving of state enterprises from bankruptcy, 
hinders the proprietary state’s monetary and supervisory functions. The 
state thus finds itself in a contradictory position. 
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4.  Privatization of the Welfare Sector 
 
4.1.  State-Responsibility in Welfare 
 
The provision of welfare services as a task for the state has been strongly 
influenced by the European welfare traditions. European governments 
continue to treat welfare services as activities that cannot be adequately 
supplied by the market alone and that must receive state subsidies. In recent 
years, however, U.S. policies have increasingly been based on the idea that 
only the market can assure the quality of welfare services and that the state 
therefore should incorporate market principles in welfare policy. 
 There is a persistent debate in the Continental European political literature 
on the question of whether American public administration, which is based on 
a public management approach, has established a new relationship between 
the public and private sectors and whether such approaches can be applied 
to law-governed European systems. This question is especially important in 
the field of welfare, because in Europe the welfare rights of citizens are 
specified in national constitutions and the welfare responsibilities of the 
state are detailed in public law. 
 Other pressing questions include whether the law-governed character of 
European public administration can provide adequate welfare services and 
whether such services will be maintained in the manner intended by law. 
 Western European theories traditionally have stressed that the public 
interest
 is better served when providing welfare services is accepted as a 
state responsibility. However, this has become somewhat muddy as a 
result of the neoliberal tendencies of the 1980s. 
 From a comparative viewpoint, the United States has provided only a 
minimum level of welfare service. The individualist tradition stresses equal 
opportunity. It is the responsibility of individuals to improve their situation 
by their own efforts. The Constitution declares political, not social or welfare, 
rights of citizens. The provision of welfare has been a mutter of public policy, 
based on the needs and influence of different economic groups. 
 However, American culture has always had an aversion to centralized 
power. This has encouraged the establishment of voluntary and charitable 
organizations. In lieu of strict regulation, public policy often encourages 
private administration of welfare services with public oversight. 
 Excluding the Great Depression, U.S. social policy never intended to 
provide more than a few governmentally administered welfare programs. 
This follows the belief of many that poverty is in many ways the fault of 
the individual, hot the result of social inequality. For this reason, social 
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welfare allocations are provided on a case-by-case basis for people in 
need. Awarding welfare is always based on discretion. It is the duty of clients 
to prove their financial condition warrants assistance. And provision of 
welfare allocations also depends on whether clients observe behavioral 
rules established by public authorities. With unemployment in the United 
States at relatively low levels in recent years, most Americans believe 
they should no longer finance welfare services for poor people. 
 Europeans view the American welfare system as stigmatizing because 
it does hot focus on the social conditions that lead to poverty, but instead 
emphasizes treatment of the symptoms of those conditions. In Continental 
Europe, the public interest is the reason cited for the state’s responsibility 
to shoulder welfare programs. Social rights are mandated in many national 
constitutions. 
 Distinctions between the welfare services of the public and private 
sectors are reflected in the differences between applied public and private 
law. Under public law, welfare belongs to the public sector. It aims to promote 
the poor, and the state must intervene to compensate for unequal market 
mechanisms. For this reason, European approaches regard the application of 
business principles in welfare services as inconsistent with the public interest. 
 
4.2. Privatization of Welfare Services 
 
Conservative U.S. economic theory holds that because of the New Deal, 
public administration began shouldering more public tasks than it could 
effectively manage, thus interfering with economic development. In this 
view the principle of free choice is violated, because welfare services are 
provided by the state and hot the marketplace. 
 This theory of privatization often is criticized in Europe, where it is 
widely held that providing welfare is fundamental to the public interest. In 
contrast to the U.S., European theories claim that there is justice in providing 
welfare services because these services are based on fair redistribution. In the 
European way of thinking, freedom means recognition of social citizen-
ship, including the right of individuals to be protected from inequality 
brought about by the market. Welfare services based on market principles 
are regarded as being inconsistent with state responsibility. 
 However, American style privatization may not mean transferring welfare 
services entirely to the private sector. Instead it may mean shifting to a so-
called “regulated market” where government maintains the responsibility 
but it can assign the operation of welfare services to private enterprise. 
Social policy is also expressed in the U.S. by other means, such as subsidies 
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and vouchers. In American government redistribution of wealth is contrary to 
market mechanisms. Rather, individuals in society should accept respon-
sibility for their own welfare. 
 Free choice and efficiency due to competition reduces costs and encourages 
partnerships between the private and public sectors. 
 The European approach attempts to maintain a boundary between the 
two sectors. But once privatization emerges, the dichotomy of public-private 
law was no longer clear. The public interest that earlier determined what 
kinds of welfare services the state should provide has now become a 
vague, intractably political principle. 
 Under U.S. policy, public administration’s role is to maintain the quality 
of welfare services. When non-competition is unavoidable, government must 
regulate the price of services. For example, institutions for the homeless 
cannot be easily shifted to a competitive environment or performed on a 
fee basis. Government must exercise near or at least distant control over 
quality and costs. 
 In the United States, some welfare services have been privatized by 
contracting out. When a fee cannot be charged for a particular welfare 
service (as is the case for services for drug addicts), the public authority often 
assists non-profit enterprises in providing services. While competition is 
often not possible in these fields, costs can be reduced by contracting for 
the best quality service at the lowest cost. 
 U.S. privatization occurs if the enterprise providing the welfare service is 
a profit or non-profit organization operating under market conditions. 
Free-of-charge services are regarded as impractical, because only fees can 
assure reasonable consumption. Direct assistance to the needy provided by 
vouchers enable the exercise of choice and at the same time provides benefits 
to individuals who are in need. 
 Typically, European approaches do not embrace this form of privatization. 
Vouchers are issued directly by public authorities. Privatization of welfare 
to non-profit (and for profit organizations) is rare. Moreover, this approach is 
not likely to displace centralized state systems. 
 Many Americans consider nonprofit organizations to be more reliable than 
for-profit businesses, especially when customers cannot judge and choose the 
quality of service. Further, where these organizations operate in a competitive 
environment, public authorities can reduce price supervision over them. 
 Consumers of nonprofit services can benefit from advantages such as 
flexibility, autonomy, customer-oriented services, and satisfaction of special 
needs. These public-nonprofit partnerships meet the requirements of the 
American public. But there are those in the United States who fear that 
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nonprofit organizations risk losing their identities as their quasi-state role 
expands. 
 The U.S. practice of incorporating competition in providing welfare 
services could well serve as a model for Europe. The state’s role in providing 
welfare services continues to be dominated by a monopolistic, centralized 
system. 
 
4.3. Privatizing Welfare Services in Hungary 
 
In Hungary since the demise of Communism, welfare has been provided 
by both the public and the private sector. There is a tangible movement 
toward withdrawal of the state from welfare services. But this drawback is 
occurring without benefit of either well-defined political concepts or 
elaborated theory. The “public interest” in welfare must be redefined. 
 The question is as to whether change in the welfare systems in Hungary 
since the transitions are more heavily influenced by American or Western 
European traditions? Is the central challenge to welfare systems meeting 
legal requirements, or is it to provide a loose safety net? Moreover, with 
constitutional and administrative regulations emphasizing that the state 
has a high-level responsibility to support welfare, how can the withdrawal 
of political support and funding for welfare be justified from a legal 
standpoint? 
 During the Communist era, welfare in Hungary served as part of the 
wealth redistribution system of the state-controlled economy. The Communist 
state assured the welfare of citizens by dictating how certain goods and 
services were provided to the general population. Not only were welfare 
services provided free of charge, but below-market prices for goods such 
as flats, foods, and utility services were established and subsidized by the 
central government. 
 Communist budgets served the interests of production more directly 
than the interest of welfare. For example, they often subsidize money-losing 
state-owned enterprises. Until the 1960s, the so-called “bureaucratic redistri-
bution”
 based on a macro-economic plan meant that markets existed only 
on the periphery of the economy. Central planning, state investments, and 
bureaucratic allocations prevailed. Starting in the 1960s, however, market 
allocations gained precedence. When that system disintegrated after the 
1990 transition, a small portion of the society became wealthy but most became 
poorer and poorer. This special market produced a new entrepreneurial 
class that have obtained great wealth and a political elite that has achieved 
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great power. The interests of these two elites are often able to suppress 
what remains of the bureaucratic state redistribution system. 
 Recently, groups whose incomes were provided historically by the state 
bureaucracy have found themselves at tremendous economic disadvantage. 
The guarantee of low incomes and subsidized basic goods and services, 
such as food, homes, and utilities under Communism has disappeared. 
 With the privatization of state-owned enterprises and creation of open 
market institutions in the post-Communist era, a “gray economy” prevails 
and the state budget is under great pressure. The percentage of the state 
budget devoted to welfare is higher in post-Communist countries than in 
developed Western nations. The political elite and “new rich” argue that 
welfare costs shouldered by the state in the former Communist regimes 
are far beyond the state’s ability to pay for them. These circumstances 
have forced the state to further withdraw from many welfare services. As 
a result, the current system can be viewed as a mechanism for maintaining 
a permanent economic underclass. Social policy continues to reflect the 
interests of the new political and entrepreneurial elite, whose members are 
economically independent from the state welfare system and are not interested 
in addressing the growing poverty which could eventually jeopardize their 
own economic success. 
 In post-Communist economies there is a pronounced pattern among the 
entrepreneurial class of successfully avoiding the payment of taxes and social 
insurance. As a result, the state budget is further depressed. The reaction 
of the government is to further increase fees and taxes, which, ironically, 
further encourages people to avoid paying them. 
 The consequences of fiscal duress are well illustrated in Hungary, where 
the contradiction between, on one hand, the constitutional requirements 
regarding social rights and, on the other, major reductions in welfare services 
has resulted in legal challenges in the Constitutional Court. The Court has 
been forced to interpret welfare rights within the framework of today’s 
more restrictive financial reality. As a result, it has enabled the legal reduction 
of welfare services. There was an attempt to amend the Constitution to 
eliminate some mandated welfare requirements. However, this attempt 
failed. 
 Although laws in the post-Communist countries still emphasize the 
state’s responsibility, this tendency by the state to withdraw from welfare 
services is increasing. The sharp difference between legal requirements 
and reality in Hungary and other post-Communist countries would be 
better served by administrative innovation and adaptation rather than 
intervention by the court. 
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 Reflecting the policy of developed Western countries, former political 
elites in post-Communist countries have attempted to develop a so-called 
“premature welfare state”
 theory. However, the “premature welfare state” 
theory misinterprets “non-intervention.” Non-intervention does not mean the 
radical withdrawal of the state from welfare. 
 Hungary has attempted to decentralize and privatize social welfare 
services in order to modernize the system. But replacement of state-welfare 
services by so-called self-organizing institutions has not taken place; instead, 
serious deterioration of welfare services has occurred. 
 Welfare privatization in Hungary has been fairly limited. The private 
sector is not sufficiently developed to allow the state to withdraw from 
providing welfare services. Due to a lack of state funding, few, if any, welfare 
services have been shifted to nonprofit organizations. Market conditions 
have been created, but there are relatively few private initiatives in the 
field of welfare, since the majority of citizens do not earn enough to pay 
for welfare services. In the wake of transition, social policy depending on 
privatization is not an attractive proposition for the near future. 
 
 
5.  Privatizing Health Care 
 
5.1. Privatization Policies in Health Care 
 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce privatization concepts of health care 
from a comparative approach. Privatization issues of Hungarian health care 
will be examined in the post-communist political-administrative environment. 
The paper will also briefly look at some principles and trends in the 
privatization of health care in the US and Western Europe. 
 Health care in Western Europe has been provided in the public sector as 
an important public service. Even in the US, where the provision of health 
care is largely based on private participation in a competitive environment, 
the government plays an important regulatory role. 
 More examples can be mentioned as to how traditions of public adminis-
tration have affected reforms in health care. Reforms aimed at establishing 
general access to health care in the US failed. Such health care reform 
would require a central health authority, which is not realistic in the 
decentralized, business-oriented US public administration. Any national 
health insurance system, based on citizens’ mandatory contribution, would 
limit customer choice and increase taxes in the US. The European practice 
of public financing of health care is inconsistent with American traditions. 
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 The privatization of health care is unlikely to alter public finance systems 
in Europe. This is because authorities have to respect health services as a 
universal constitutional right when organizing health care. Instead, reduced 
subsidization and increased cost sharing, as a result of privatization, 
signals state withdrawal from health care. The privatization of health care 
has not always resulted in an extension of market mechanisms in Europe, 
but heavier state intervention and regulation. The aforementioned limitations 
of privatization are closely related to the nature of the centralized and 
law-governed European public administrations. 
 Several variations of market mechanisms vs. state regulations have 
developed in health care. Health care is probably the area of the economy in 
which public vs. private elements in finance, regulation and services have 
interwoven in the most complex way. Privatization in the widest sense 
means reduction of the public sector, but several forms of privatization 
can take place in practical reality. 
 Health care in the US, similar to other services, is a business activity, 
and privatization policies aim to achieve even more efficient health services 
by using business principles. Health care services in the Scandinavian 
countries, as opposed to the American practice, are provided by the state 
based on social welfare principles. 
 It is important to define the public purpose which privatization policy 
has to follow in health care, as privatization will determine the roles of the 
state, market and civil sectors. 
 While the possibilities and limitations of privatization in health care are 
clearly seen in developed western countries, privatization is an unpredictable 
issue in post-communist Europe. The need for privatizing health care is 
evident, but it is difficult to predict exactly which kind of health care 
model may evolve in these countries. 
 
Hungary
 has created a public law system based on the continental 
European model, but bureaucratic administrative traditions from the communist 
state remain. The premise of this chapter is that these communist attitudes 
have effected health care reforms and developed a different form of practice 
for privatization than in Western Europe.
 For this reason, health care reforms 
in Hungary are fairly vague. 
 
5.2. Public Interest in Health Care 
 
European health care policies have followed two main areas of public interest 
since the 2nd World War, named solidarity and efficiency. 
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Solidarity
 means that services are available for all citizens and contri-
bution to health care should be proportional to their income. This is a main 
principle of health care everywhere in Europe. 
 National governments are obliged by federal laws to provide free health 
services for poor and elderly people in the US. Medicare and Medicaid 
obviously represent welfare issues, but are exceptional, rather than a general 
commitment on the part of the government. Solidarity has not developed 
in the individualistic American society. The ideology of customer choice 
represents the interest of the American middle class which can obtain 
health services at market prices, but is unwilling to contribute to health 
care for the poor. 
 
Efficiency
 in health care in the widest sense means that funds generated 
for health care should provide the best outcome, such as quality of services, 
customer satisfaction, health conditions for the population, etc. It also 
includes the improvement of other factors outside health care, such as 
preventive programs. 
 American theories, not accidentally, have established a most differentiated 
way of efficiency and effectiveness in health care. This is due to American 
administrative traditions. Not only health care, but all public adminis-
tration has always been based on business principles in the US. 
 The privatization policy in Europe was expected to assure more efficient 
health services from reduced financial resources. Privatization of health 
care did not merely mean withdrawal of the state, but an increase in the 
role of market mechanisms, such as competition, deregulation, additional 
private insurance, etc. This way of privatization is called “regulated market” 
in health care. 
 Opportunities for privatization are limited in European health care. 
Solidarity has been protected by constitutional regulations as citizens’ universal 
right to health services. Regulated prices or bureaucratic financial rules still 
prevail here, due to the requirement of global cost containment in public 
finance, too. 
 Privatization practices in Europe cannot evidently prove that privatization 
has resulted in greater economic efficiency in health care, or just trans-
formed financial resources by altering contributions. 
 The most important difference between a regulated or free market in health 
care is the public and private character of the finance system. The percentage 
of public finance is low in American health care (only Medicare and Medicaid) 
but dominant in Europe. Only one example can be mentioned as to regulation 
limiting market mechanisms in the US: the regulated prices of Medicare 
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and Medicaid. Due to the influence of the medical business lobby, the 
requirement of global cost containment has less relevance there than in Europe. 
 Privatizing health care is problematic in Hungary, because neither 
solidarity nor efficiency can be enforced. 
 The Hungarian Constitution declares that everybody has the right to the 
best health care which should be guaranteed by the state through its health 
care system. This kind of regulation obviously contradicts the increased 
state withdrawal from health care: universal access to health care is still 
guaranteed by law, but provision is inadequate. The sharp difference between 
constitutional regulation and practical reality is a basic characteristic of 
the so-called “premature welfare state”. 
 Redistribution that has recently developed in the Hungarian health 
care system does not insure reasonable contribution from citizens to the 
health services. 
 Theoretically, national health insurance is an insurance-based system, 
which means that citizens have to contribute after their incomes. National 
health insurance in fact assures the universal right of health care to citizens. 
So, the costs of the health care of the growing number of unemployed and 
pensioners should be financed by citizens’ contributions. 
 At the same time, the budget for national health insurance has been 
decreased by half in the last ten years, due to the lack of proportionate sharing 
in contributions. Business associations ere unwilling to pay contributions to 
health care, and can successfully avoid doing so. Wealthier people can afford 
private health-care services, or pay under-the-table money for better state 
health services. 
 People with lower incomes, such as civil servants and the employed, 
contribute the most to the budget of the national health insurance. As a 
result, the percentage of private finance is increasing, but public finance 
is proportionally
 decreasing in the total cost of health care. 
 According to general opinion, increasing contribution of citizens to health 
care is not realistic in the current system. Additional Financial resources 
could be drawn in the following way: a) Imposing tax on unhealthy products, 
such as alcohol, tobacco, etc., and transferring it to health care. b) Establishing 
additional health insurance using private insurance companies. c) Compulsory 
co-payment for health services d) Selling state/local government owned 
health institutions. 
 No single government has to date made any plan for drawing financial 
resources from anything other than citizens’ contributions. 
 
Greater economic efficiency of health care has not been achieved in 
Hungary, either. This is especially difficult because many bureaucratic 
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features of the former economic administrative system still prevail, and have 
led to a waste of the decreasing financial resources for health care. 
 Health care under communism was funded from the state budget in a 
bureaucratic, centralized system. The funding of various health services was 
determined by political decisions. The provision of health services was a state 
monopoly and health care institutions were owned and closely controlled 
by the state. As in the case of state enterprises, health care institutions 
were financed by the state, no matter how inefficient they were. Informal 
bargains between politicians and the directors of health care institutions 
determined how financial resources were transferred to health care. 
 Many think that the failures of the health care system are caused by the 
influence of bureaucratic coordination and an unregulated market. Alongside 
the existing bureaucratic coordination, there has developed an unregulated 
market, such as the pharmaceutical and medical equipment industry, private 
clinics, etc. The government controls the health system by traditional 
bureaucratic means, or lets it remain uncontrolled. 
 
5.3. Health Care Policies in the Politico-Administrative Environment 
 
Health care policy in Western Europe is determined by political consensus. In 
other words, ad hoc or regular organizations representing several groups 
of health care, such as health authorities, providers, patients, etc., are 
established to negotiate health care policy. Health care policy in Europe 
means no more than an informal consensus-based political decision that 
should be regulated by laws. Political decisions on health care reforms are 
made in a democratic way, although the public administration system 
entrusted to regulate them has been centralized. 
 
The Americans
 are adverse to any centralized power, and believe that 
only decentralized public administration and a wide civil sector can 
guarantee democracy. Health care matters are not extensively regulated by 
public laws there. Neither federal nor state laws determine accountability 
for health departments with regard to health services, with only a few 
exceptions, such as AIDS, health care for the poor, etc. Public laws deal with 
the quality of health services or other technical issues, but typically do not 
determine tasks for health authorities. 
 In the absence of intense legal regulations, nonprofit organizations in 
the US have more freedom to influence health care policy. This is also due 
to the traditions of self-governance. The lobby (pressure group), for example 
a medical association, is a kind of nonprofit organization which represents 
an interest group. Lobbies are not informal, but legally regulated and registered 
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organizations in the US. Lobbying activities are a most important guarantee 
to American democracy. 
 Nonprofit organizations are in no way limited to deal with public matters 
in the US. This is because there are no public issues that only public 
authorities are entitled to deal with. Consequently, health care policy is 
primarily developed by nonprofit organizations, rather than government 
authorities. Health care policy, similar to other public policies in the US, 
is in fact an applied practice. 
 
The Hungarian government has not yet established a clear health care 
policy.
 Instead, it is left to day-to-day political goals as to how health care 
issues are regulated. Steps toward health care reforms that have been seen 
during the last ten years can be concluded only on the basis of legal rules, 
not on health care policy, because government decisions on health care are 
often kept in secret, and made behind the scenes. 
 The process of legislation is governed by law in Hungary. It is the task of 
the Ministry of Health Care to elaborate a proposal for laws on health care. 
The minister who is accountable for the operation of the ministry is appointed 
by, and can be recalled by, the prime minister. Acts on health care are passed 
by the Parliament, where political parties in power have a majority. Therefore, 
both the preferences of the minister of health care and the strongest political 
party currently in power prevail, when health care issues are enacted. 
 There are “checks and balances” in the legislation, with varying degrees of 
impact. The president of the Hungarian Republic has not exercised his right 
to veto when it comes to health care issues, but more acts on health care 
have been attacked before the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court 
has refused to decide in those cases where health care policy was debated. 
 Health care pressure groups also influence legislation. Government is 
legally obliged to withdraw representative organizations from the codification 
of health care. However, laws do not state clearly which lobbies (con-
sultative, opinionative, etc.) should be withdrawn, nor how to do so. 
 Under communism, representative organizations were established by 
state order. The role of these “artificial” representative organizations was to 
demonstrate to the public that the communist state was democratic. This 
type of tradition still prevails when government authorities do not take 
pressure groups’ opinions into account and consider that only the government is 
competent to make important decisions. Government authorities often violate 
acts in the process of legislation, wherein they exclude publicity and arrive 
at informal political bargains. 
 Health care is declared by law to be a public issue which only govern-
ment authorities can deal with. The state is accountable for providing 
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health care. Health care policy, however, should be based on a consensus 
between both state and civil sectors, including physicians, citizens, health 
employees, etc. Only a consensus-based health care policy has any chance 
of modernizing health care. 
 Lacking consensus, inadequate government decisions are implemented 
regarding health care. This is generally because government authorities cannot 
represent public interests in health care, such as solidarity and efficiency; 
rather, these authorities reflect the personal interests of their leaders. Political 
parties in power choose to share the benefits of privatization through means of 
corruption and via the acquisition of the property of health care institutions. 
 The modernization of health care, on the other hand, would hurt the 
interests of certain social groups, and not result in any political benefit for 
the government. Business firms, for example, which share extra profits with 
the management of health institutions for providing diagnostic services 
and senior physicians, who receive most of the under-the-table money 
from patients, are interested in maintaining the status quo, but manifestly 
have no interest in modernizing. The public would most likely be against 
additional health insurance, seeing as people would see an increasingly 
narrower state health services in such a reform. 
  
5.4. Efficiency of Health Care in Developed Countries 
 
It is well-known that health care providers are interested in extending 
services in order to achieve higher income. Customers do not have enough 
information to judge if health services are really necessary. This is called 
“asymmetrical information” in the market relations of health care. Not only 
are health services typified by “asymmetrical information,” but as being 
healthy is the most important value for individuals, demand for health 
services is less limited than that for other goods. 
 All financial regulations in Europe which have tried to limit the costs of 
health services at the level of health care providers, while assuring the quality 
of services, have failed. All of the applied incentives have disadvantages. 
The system of “global budgeting” encourages providers to provide less 
service, but does not guarantee quality. Providers are interested in serving 
more patients in the “fee-for-service” or “day system”. The most widespread 
method is the DRG (Diagnosis-related groups) system, which incites efficient 
service, but only in the case of one patient, not many. 
 Insurance companies in the American private insurance system can 
transfer higher costs to customers by increasing insurance fees, although 
competition between insurance companies forces them to be prudent. The 
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price for health services and insurance is stipulated by contracting parties, 
such as health care providers, insurance companies and patients. Only the 
prices of Medicare and Medicaid are regulated in the US. 
 Transferring higher costs to customers is not possible in the European 
publicly financed system, because the measure of contributions to health care 
is determined by law. Therefore, financial rules must meet the requirements 
of global cost containment. In case of loss, the state subsidizes health care 
from the state budget, rather than increasing contributions from citizens. 
Such a subsidy is not well received by the economic policy. 
 American health insurance companies control the costs of providers 
by using differentiated means for cost-effectiveness. Cost-effectiveness is 
enforced by competition between health providers, customers and insurance 
companies. There is a belief in the US that only market mechanisms, such as 
competition, private ownership and profit-motive, can enforce the quality 
and efficiency of services. Regulated prices and transfer of capacity are the 
rule in European publicly financed systems. 
 Health providers, both for- and nonprofit, are interested in profit in the 
US, although in a different way. Communities often establish nonprofit 
hospitals. The nonprofit character of hospitals has a different meaning than in 
Europe. Nonprofit hospitals in Europe can not pursue business-like activities, 
nor make a profit. Nonprofit hospitals are normally financed by the state 
or the national health insurance plan so that social welfare issues in the 
provision of health services can be maintained. 
 The community, as the owner of nonprofit hospitals, can not directly 
share in the profits, but can generate it for publicly beneficial investments. Non-
profit hospitals in the US are a special legal form of business associations. 
Nonprofit hospitals in the European sense are exceptional in the US, because 
they are thought to be inefficient, and a waste of taxpayers’ money. 
Scandinavian examples, on the other hand, show that state-owned health 
institutions can provide efficient and high-quality services. 
 According to American practice, health services are one of the most 
marketable services. Only the technical requirements of health services 
should be regulated by laws. According to American privatization theories, 
European governments provide services as public goods, because these 
services are thought so important for the public that the government 
guarantees them, regardless of whether consumers can pay for them or not. 
These services are directly provided by public-owned institutions or simply 
subsidized by central or local government authorities. Demand for these 
services necessarily increases due to the low price, which leads to a waste 
of financial resources. 
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 However, Europeans consider the American health care inefficient in 
terms of insufficient global cost containment. Americans argue that the 
reason why the US spends a higher proportion of GDP for health care is 
not the ineffective provision of health care, but a better quality of service 
based on a higher level of medical techniques and research. Higher global 
costs of health care are also a result of customer choice. In the US, the 
customer decides how much to spend on health care. 
  
5.5. Spontaneous and Regulated Privatization in Hungary 
 
Spontaneous
 privatization of health care happens when local governments, 
without any relevant legal regulations, initiate privatization of their health 
institutions. When privatization is regulated, legal rules, determining basic 
principles and requirements, serve as a framework for privatization. 
 Health institutions were under state ownership during communism, but 
at the beginning of the 1990s they were handed over to local governments. 
Local governments, with few exceptions, such as national clinics and 
medical universities, own health institutions in Hungary. 
 Constitutions declare general state-accountability for health care, but it 
is the responsibility of local governments to provide health services in their 
administrative areas. Financial resources for this task are assured by the 
state budget, but not at the necessary level. 
 Health institutions operate in a dual financial system: local governments 
are obligated by law to provide the building and medical equipment for 
their health institutions, but the national health insurance finances services 
in a DRG system. Financial laws do not say in what manner local govern-
ments have to maintain the building of the clinic and assure medical 
equipment. Local government can not afford to pay much for their health 
institutions. 
 Local governments are entitled by the act on local government to 
decide important issues of their health institutions. These rights of local 
governments, like the rights to autonomy and ownership, are protected by 
the Constitution, as well. Actually, it is the right of local governments to 
sell, lease, or transform their health institutions into business associations. 
Any proposal for acts on privatizing health care can not violate these 
constitutional rights. 
 All physicians were public servants before 1990. Laws entitled family 
doctors to provide primary health services in the form of business associations. 
Local governments must contract with them to supervise their activity 
from the point of view of continuity and general availability of services. 
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Family doctors legally received the right to praxis in 2000.
 Right to 
praxis is an exclusive right to provide primary health services in a given area 
determined by the local government. The owner of the right to praxis can sell 
and inherit his or her praxis. Family doctors often buy the clinic and medical 
equipment from the local government, too. Privatization of the primary 
health system has almost been completed in Hungary. 
 
Spontaneous privatization has to some extent taken place in the secondary 
health care system.
 Private firms have invested in medical diagnostic equip-
ment and own and operate them in health institutions. Due to their lobbying 
activity, national health insurance finances diagnostic services to such a high 
level that extra profit can be achieved. Paradoxically, health institutions 
are often loss-making and close to bankruptcy, thanks to the insufficient 
finances of the national health insurance and the poor maintenance of local 
governments. 
 Another way for spontaneous privatization of the secondary health system 
is when local government gives the right of operation to a private firm. 
The private firm will have the right to buy or use the property, such as the 
building and medical equipment, and to reorganize health institutions. This 
kind of privatization can theoretically be justified with better professional 
skills on the part of the private firm which can operate health institutions 
more efficiently than the bureaucratic local government authorities. 
 The practical reality shows that in most cases members of the political 
elite are the beneficiaries of this kind of privatization. Local governments 
are not required by law to invite a tender open to the public. There are no 
professional or other requirements for privatization, either. 
 
Neither quality nor efficiency of services can be guaranteed, nor can the 
accountability of local governments be enforced in this system. The private 
firm can not be controlled if it generates financial resources of its own, but 
not for public benefit. This path to privatization can easily become the hotbed 
of corruption, as well. 
 
Privatization of secondary health care systems should be regulated by 
laws. Legal regulations have to define some principles of privatization, such 
as democracy and legacy, in order to guarantee incentives for better quality 
and efficiency. 
 
5.6. Efficiency in Hungarian Health Care 
 
It is generally accepted in continental Europe that national health insurance can 
serve efficiency better than if health care is financed from the state budget. 
The reason is that it is clearer for the customers how their contributions 
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will be spent on health care, if the national health insurance is separated from 
the state budget and owns the funds, than if it is up to day-to-day political 
decisions as to how health care will be financed from the state budget. 
 Continental European countries traditionally organize health care by national 
health insurance. Funding of the national health insurance is collected from 
the compulsory contributions of citizens. The contribution is proportional 
to income, which serves social policy. (Wealthier people pay the costs of 
the poor and the chronically ill.) Health care provision is equal in national 
health insurance, regardless of contribution. 
 When national health insurance (NHI) was established in 1990 in Hungary, 
it was thought to be a step toward a more efficient health system. However, 
the government’s idea was to shake off responsibility for health care as 
the most problematic area of welfare. It could be seen at that time that the 
income of the health care budget would decrease due to the black economy. 
The recent government centralized the NHI fond under government control 
again in 1998. 
 The NHI was governed by a body represented by government authorities, 
health care providers and customers, and lost its right to determine its 
financial issues in 1998. Instead, it is the right of the government to make 
important decisions about the fond of the national health insurance. The 
NHI is actually a part of the state budget in the recent system. Losses of 
the NHI can be compensated from the state budget, as well. 
 We can see that the government has a conflict of interest when the NHI is 
formally separate from the state budget, while the government still maintains 
control by keeping the right to determine its budget. The fond of the NHI 
is decreasing and wasted, due to the insufficient finance system. It does not 
serve efficiency, either, if the state subsidizes the losses of the NHI. The 
government keeps the right in this way to make a cost/benefit trade-off, 
depending on the current political situation. 
 Laws determine 20 sub-areas of the health care budget, such as operational 
costs, medicine, primary and secondary health care, etc. The Ministry of 
Health Care calculates how many hospital-beds can be financed in each 
county. Then the Office of the NHI makes an agreement on bed-capacity in 
each county. These agreements are in fact administrative decisions made 
by the Office of the NHI. The Office of the NHI is a public authority, not 
a purchaser, when it comes to distributing capacity, which circumstance 
basically determines these agreements. 
 The current health finance system is still characterized by a communist-
type planned economy, wherein a central plan has been broken down into 
a number of steps to a group of state enterprises. 
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 It would serve economic efficiency, if, instead of a public authority, the 
legal form of the national health insurance were either regional not-for-
profit companies, or business associations in the country. It would be 
important to transfer capacities to these insurance companies so that they as 
purchasers could buy health services in a finance system based on financial 
incentives, and sufficient quality control. Health care providers would bell 
their health services, and compete both for financial resources and patients. 
 Health care providers, similarly to the former state enterprises, are still 
not entitled to make their own economic decisions, such as investments, 
making and using profit. 
 Local governments, as the owners of health care institutions, can afford to 
spend much on maintaining buildings and buying medical equipment. Health 
care providers sell their health services in a market, where the Office of 
NHI is in a monopoly position and prices are regulated to be low, due to the 
pressure of the state budget. Furthermore, health care providers are purchasers 
when buying medicine at market prices. The pharmaceutical and medical 
equipment industries having been privatized and deregulated, charge monopoly 
prices. 
 Health care providers are forced to broaden their services in order to avoid 
bankruptcy. The Office of NHI is not sufficiently interested in checking these 
exaggerated services. The more services are provided on global level, the 
lower prices will be determined to be by the Office of NHI. Paradoxically, 
those health institutions that provide adequate services are operating at a loss. 
 This tendency does not serve efficiency on the global level but is instead a 
waste of financial resources. 
 Incentives should promote the requirement for “service on an adequate 
level.” It is a general tendency in the Hungarian health system that physicians 
treat patients in hospitals, even if it is not necessary, so that hospitals receive 
a higher income, and physicians more under-the-table money. The require-
ment of “service on an adequate level” can be achieved by dividing in- and 
outpatient systems. Physicians will be interested in treating patients in an out-
patient system if they get the right to praxis and finance in a DRG system. 
 Health institutions would undoubtedly be more efficient were they to 
operate in the traditional business manner. Business is regulated by corporate 
law in a refined way so that sufficient economic decisions and financial 
accountability can be assured. Health institutions are closely controlled by 
local government. Limiting the autonomy of health institutions does not 
aid in rational economic activity. Health institutions should compete for 
financial resources in a system that allows the national health insurance 
scheme to buy higher quality, more efficient services. 
